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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: In this medical malpractice action, did the District Court properly grant 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiffs failure to meet her prima 
facie burden to show, by expert testimony, that Plaintiff suffered non-speculative 
damages where Plaintiffs medical expert "cannot measure, describe, compare, quantify, 
isolate, gauge, estimate, apportion, or delimit damages which may have been proximately 
caused by Defendants' negligence." (R449). 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate 
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is 
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). However, a party may not create an issue of fact by opposing a motion for 
summary judgment with an affidavit that conflicts with deposition testimony. Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
1 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES, 
RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
ISSUE PRESERVED IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Defendants do not dispute that the issue in this case was preserved for appeal, but 
dispute Plaintiffs assertion that "the trial court granted summary judgment on grounds 
other than those raised by the Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment." 
Defendants' primary argument in the motion for summary judgment and at oral argument 
was that "Plaintiff has failed to establish the required element of causative damages" 
(R170), which was the very argument upon which the District Court based its decision. 
On appeal, Plaintiff relies on Tingev v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588 to 
argue the District Court erred. This case was not mentioned in any of the briefing on the 
motion or at oral argument, and thus the District Court did not have the benefit of 
Plaintiffs argument below. Her arguments as related to Tingev are therefore waived. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action involving an 84 year old woman who has 
suffered from glaucoma since 1962. In 1995, she sought treatment from Defendants, who 
are eye care professionals in St George, Utah. Plaintiff stopped seeing Defendants in 
2001 when she moved to Virginia and did not obtain any eye care for two months, despite 
having been told to follow-up in 10 days. In 2003, she initiated this action, alleging 
Defendants negligently treated her glaucoma and caused her to lose some of her vision. 
2 
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After completion of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing 
plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof because her medical expert could not testify to 
any reasonable degree of medical probability what alleged damages were a causal result 
of Defendants' care. The District Court granted Defendants' motion on the basis that any 
jury award for Plaintiff would necessarily be based on speculation. The Court found that 
"[i]f Dr. Stein [Plaintiffs expert] cannot measure, describe, compare, quantify, identify, 
isolate, gauge, estimate, apportion, or delimit the damages which may have been 
proximately caused by Defendants' negligence, no jury can be expected to do so without 
indulging in rank speculation." (R449) 
Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that a doctrine borrowed from 
automobile personal injury actions should be applied to trump well-established case law 
governing medical malpractice actions in Utah. She argues that this doctrine relieves her 
of her obligation to establish, through expert testimony, that some identifiable injury was 
caused by Defendants' alleged negligence. 
Plaintiffs arguments are not consistent with Utah law that requires medical 
malpractice Plaintiffs to establish each element of a negligence claim. Furthermore, in 
medical malpractice actions, in order to satisfy the Plaintiffs burden, expert testimony is 
generally required. This Court should affirm the District Court's granting of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as Plaintiff failed to meet her prima facie burden to allow 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this case to proceed to a jury and Plaintiffs new argument on appeal has no application to 
the facts and circumstances of this case. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With respect to the issue on appeal, causation, no dispute exists as to the key 
material facts in this matter: No medical expert has articulated what damages Plaintiff has 
suffered as the result of the Defendants' alleged negligent care. Plaintiffs statement of 
facts running from pages 4-23 in her brief focus on the standard of care and are largely 
irrelevant to the issues on appeal. See Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The District Court commented that in the briefing below there was "some 
excessive involvement with irrelevancies such as the element of breach of the standard of 
care." (R446). 
Although the parties dispute whether defendants' treatment of Plaintiff s glaucoma 
breached the standard of care, this issue is irrelevant to this appeal. The only issue is 
whether Plaintiff has met her burden of proof to establish causation through expert 
testimony. Plaintiffs own medical expert testified that (1) glaucoma patients may have 
received excellent healthcare and still may suffer vision loss (R243), and (2) he cannot 
state what Plaintiffs vision would be if she had received the care he believes she should 
have received from Defendants. (R251,253,268) 
Plaintiffs "Statement of Facts" section also mingles Plaintiffs expert's testimony 
made during his deposition with those statements he made in a subsequent affidavit in 
4 
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opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In making its ruling, the 
District Court found the timing of Plaintiff s expert's testimony significant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A .^ The Parties 
1. Plaintiff lives in Virginia and is 84 years old. (R195,199) She suffers 
from cataracts, diabetes, and high blood pressure. (R196, 204, 205, 217) Plaintiff has a 
family history of glaucoma and first started going to a doctor for treatment of her eye 
conditions in approximately 1963, over 40 years ago. (R216) She has been taking 
glaucoma medications for about 20 years. (R216) 
2. Defendant Dr. Snow obtained his Medical Degree in 1974 and completed a 
residency in Ophthalmology in 1979. (R232-33) He is board-certified in his speciality. 
(R233) 
3. Defendant Dr. Ricks graduated with a Doctor of Optometry Degree from 
Southern California College of Optometry in 1986. (R224). Dr. Ricks has worked at the 
Dixie Eye Center for the last 15 years. (R224) 
4. Plaintiff sought treatment from Defendants for her glaucoma beginning in 
1995 and continuing through 2001. (R241-42) At her last appointment with either of the 
Defendants, she acknowledged that Dr. Ricks told her that she needed to make a follow-
up appointment with Dr. Snow "in 10 days or so." (R207,211) She did not keep this 
5 
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appointment. (R208-09) Instead, she moved to Virginia and waited over two months 
before going to another eye physician. (R210,213-14,242) 
B. Non-Negligent Causes of Vision Loss 
5. Glaucoma is a degenerative eye disease with no known cure. (R221-22) 
Glaucoma is a leading cause of vision loss in the United States. Due to the degenerative 
nature of the disease, it tends to inflict the greatest damage on the elderly. (R256,268-69) 
Glaucoma's effect on people, however, varies widely based on several characteristics of 
an individual. (Rl63,249) 
6. Plaintiffs Ophthalmology expert, Dr. Robert Stein, and one of Plaintiff s 
treating Ophthalmologist, Steven S. Newman, M.D. (R215-223) both consistently 
testified that even with the best of care, a person with glaucoma may suffer loss of vision 
from the disease. (R223,243) 
7. After the Defendants' treatment, Plaintiff moved to Virginia and 
sought care from Dr. Newman. Dr. Newman testified as follows: 
(a) Dr. Newman is a neuro-ophthalmologist and conducts orbital 
and oculoplastic surgery. He is a professor of Ophthalmology at the 
University of Virginia Health Systems in Charlottesville, Virginia. (R158) 
(b) Plaintiffs eye problems are probably caused by her glaucoma, 
although he could not rule out a variety of other causes of optic nerve 
pathology. (R218) 
6 
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(c) Regardless of whether treatment is successful in reducing eye 
pressures in glaucoma patients, there is no guarantee that you can stop the 
progression of the glaucoma. (R219) 
(d) As patients age, they are more at risk for age-related macular 
degeneration, corneal problems, and dry-eye problems. (R220) 
(e) Glaucoma is a progressive disease and probably the second 
leading cause of blindness in the world. (R221) 
(f) Patients like Plaintiff may have received excellent 
healthcare along the way and still have experienced the loss of vision 
that Plaintiff now has. (R223) 
8. Plaintiffs own Ophthalmology expert, Dr. Robert Stein, testified as 
follows: 
(a) Dr. Stein reviewed the medical records and depositions of 
Plaintiff. (R24) 
(b) Dr. Stein opined that Dr. Snow and Dr. Ricks should have 
provided more definitive care and been more aggressive in attempting to 
lower Plaintiff s eye pressures. (R241,246-47,260) He acknowledged, 
however, that loss of vision such as that suffered by Plaintiff can occur 
even with the best of care. (R243) 
7 
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(c) Chronic glaucoma is generally a condition of aging and can 
be present at varying degrees. Some patients can sustain higher levels of 
eye pressure without damage to the optic nerve, while other people can get 
optic nerve damage even when pressures are within normal ranges. (R256) 
Plaintiff was on the more difficult side in terms of obtaining good control of 
her pressures. (R256) 
(d) Dr. Stein has had glaucoma patients like Plaintiff who were 
difficult to control in terms of eye pressures. (R250-51) Some of these 
difficult glaucoma patients had eye pressures that were out of control no 
matter what he did for them. (R251) 
(e) The impact of elevated eye pressure on an optic nerve is 
dependent upon a variety of factors, including the amount of pressure, the 
resilience of the optic nerve, the length of time the pressure is elevated, and 
whether there is intervening treatment to bring down the pressures. (R257-
58) 
(f) Dr. Stein acknowledged that Dr. Snow tried different things 
and adjusted Plaintiffs medications and that these efforts brought down 
Plaintiffs eye pressures. (R259) 
8 
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(g) Between 1995 and April 2001, Plaintiff lost at least fifty 
percent of her vision. (R261) Some of this loss may have been from a 
cataract that had developed in her right eye. (R261-62) Another possibility 
for Plaintiffs loss of vision is the aging process of the blood vessels 
causing a lack of circulation. (R263) Other causes can be compressive 
diseases and tumors along the optic nerve extending back toward the brain 
area or her diabetes. (R263-65) 
C. Plaintiffs Expert's Testimony 
9. When he was deposed, Dr. Stein could not state what Plaintiffs vision 
would be if she had received the care he believes she should have received. Significantly, 
he testified as follows: 
Q: Do you agree that even if Ms. Sohm had been treated as you believe she 
should have been treated, we can't say what her particular level of eye 
vision would be at this point 
A: No. 
Q: Is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
(R251) 
10. Although Dr. Stein opined that there is a likelihood that Plaintiff would not 
have suffered visual field losses to the same degree had there been intervention and that it 
"could" and "might" have been better, when asked, "Can you state that with any 
9 
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specificity to a reasonable degree of medical probability?" he responded, "I can't 
really do that." (R252-53) 
11. Both Doctors Newman and Stein opined that Plaintiffs vision loss 
could have occurred even without negligent care. (R218-23, 251) In fact, both 
physicians recognized that patients have suffered similar vision loss even with the 
appropriate care. (R223,243) Although Dr. Stein was critical of Defendants' treatment, 
he was unable or unwilling during his deposition to rule out non-negligent causes of 
Plaintiffs vision loss or to assist Plaintiff in establishing a causal link between 
Defendants' treatment and Plaintiffs vision loss. (R251) 
D. Pleadings 
12. In October 2003, Plaintiff filed her Complaint asserting a claim for 
medical negligence against both defendant eye care professionals who cared for 
Plaintiffs chronic glaucoma, as well as their employer, Dixie Eye Center. (Rl-8) 
Plaintiffs Complaint contends that "as a result of Defendants' negligence in failing to 
adequately and timely treat Plaintiffs glaucoma, Plaintiff has suffered permanent damage 
to her eyes and vision." (R7) 
13. After completion of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment 
arguing that Plaintiff could not establish a causal link between the alleged negligence on 
the part of Defendants and her claimed damages. (Rl 56-172) 
10 
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14. In support of their motion, Defendants submitted affidavits of two experts, 
both of whom opined that Plaintiff could not establish causation without resorting to 
speculation. (R269-272,273-75,303-05) Defendant Jeffrey R. Ricks, O.D. retained 
William Bogus, O.D. to review all of the relevant medical records and depositions in this 
case and to render opinions. (R269-72) Dr. Bogus testified by affidavit that he was a 
licensed optometrist practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah, and was familiar with the 
Plaintiffs allegations in this lawsuit. Dr. Bogus noted Plaintiffs extensive history of 
glaucoma, which covered at least 23 years and included evaluations by at least six 
different doctors and over 80 office visits. In contrast to Plaintiffs extensive history of 
treatment, Dr. Ricks' treatment of Plaintiff was limited to only two examinations. (R269-
72) 
15. Based upon his background, education, training, experience, and review of 
the relevant records in this case, Dr. Bogus opined that Dr. Ricks complied fully with the 
applicable standard of care for an optometrist under the circumstances and time frame in 
which he cared for Plaintiff. (R271) Furthermore, Dr. Bogus stated that Dr. Ricks did not 
cause Plaintiffs claimed damages and injuries in this case. (R271) 
16. With respect to causation, Dr. Bogus reviewed the deposition of Plaintiff s 
expert, Dr Robert Stein, and noted that Dr. Stein could not say what Plaintiffs level of 
vision would be if she had been treated as Dr. Stein believed she should have been 
treated. (R271) Based on his expert medical opinion, Dr. Bogus agreed with Dr. Stein 
11 
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and stated that, given Plaintiffs age, chronic condition, intervening events, lack of 
compliance, and the care of other treating providers, any of the preceding factors could 
have caused Plaintiffs vision loss. (R271) < 
17. Defendant Ronald L. Snow, M.D., retained an expert, Kuldev Singh, 
M.D., to review all of the relevant medical records and depositions in this case and to 
i 
render opinions. (R273-75) Dr. Singh provided an affidavit in support of Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, which provided the following foundation for his opinions: 
(1) he is a licensed ophthalmologist in California (R274); (2) he is national Board 
Certified in Ophthalmology (R274); (3) he is a professor of Ophthalmology at Stanford 
University (R278); (4) he reviewed all of Plaintiff s medical records and the deposition 
transcripts of Plaintiff, Dr. Newman, Dr. Snow, Dr. Ricks and Dr. Stein. (R274) 
18. Based on his review of the foregoing materials and his skill and experience 
as a licensed ophthalmologist and considering Plaintiffs more than 20 year history of 
glaucoma, the nature of this disease, Plaintiffs advanced age, her lack of compliance to 
instructions given by Dr. Snow, Dr. Ricks, and other physicians, Dr. Singh stated it would 
require pure speculation to causally relate any vision loss suffered by Plaintiff to any act 
or omission alleged against either Dr. Snow or Dr. Ricks. (R274) 
19. Supported by Dr. Bogus's and Dr. Singh's expert opinions, Defendants 
12 
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requested that the District Court grant them summary judgment because Plaintiffs 
expert's opinions failed to create a triable issue of fact with respect to causation and 
would have required the jury to speculate in making any award. (R171) 
E. Plaintiffs Attempt to Create an Issue of Fact by Submitting a 
Contradictory Subsequent Affidavit from Dr. Stein, 
20. In opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff produced 
an affidavit from Dr. Stein. Dr. Stein's affidavit, however, did not rule out or account for 
the possibilities of vision loss due to non-negligent causes. (R397 ^[16-19). 
21. Dr. Stein's affidavit offered vague testimony that Defendants' care was the 
cause of some of Plaintiff s loss of vision. (R397-98). To the extent Dr. Stein's affidavit 
attempts to establish a causal link and rules out other non-negligent causes of Plaintiff s 
vision loss, Dr. Stein's affidavit necessarily contradicts his deposition testimony.1 
22. In opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
1
 (Compare R243) (vision loss in a case like Ms. Sohm's can occur even with the 
best of care); R245 (patient compliance could cause fluctuations); R250-53 (cannot rule 
out non-negligence; difficult glaucoma patients may have out of control eye pressures no 
matter what you do for them; cannot say what her particular level of eye vision would be 
without negligence); R254-56 (patient compliance issues and critical timing; patient did 
not return to Dr. Snow in 7-10 days as instructed and instead went two months before 
receiving eye care); R257-58 (variety of non-negligent factors that could cause problems 
including resilience of optic nerve, intervening treatment, thickness of cornea); R261-62 
(Plaintiffs cataract could cause vision loss); R263-65 (additional non-negligent causes 
including aging process of the blood vessels, compressive diseases, metabolic conditions, 
ischemic blood supply due to age, the patient's diabetes) with R397-98 (affidavit 
attempting to establish causation, including "may" have had no loss, "could" have been 
dramatically better). 
13 
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proximate cause, Plaintiff focused substantially on the facts relating to the standard of 
care and Defendants' treatment and care of her glaucoma. (R320-27) 
23. Dr. Stein testified that he cannot testify to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability what damages may have been caused by Defendants' supposed negligence. 
(R396-97). Dr. Stein stated in his affidavit that Plaintiffs vision may have been 
"significantly" or "substantially" better and that it would not have been damaged "to this 
degree" without ever defining what these statements mean. (R397-98) 
F. The District Court's Granting of Motion for Summary Judgment 
24. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was fully briefed and 
submitted to the District Court. Oral argument was held on November 23, 2005. At oral 
argument, the parties focused on the issue of damages caused by the asserted negligence, 
and the District Court took the motion under advisement. (Tr. at 35) 
25. The District Court issued its Ruling, granting Defendants' motion because it 
concluded Plaintiff had not met her burden of proof and any jury award would necessarily 
be based on speculation. (R446-49). In its Ruling, the District Court stated: 
Dr. Stein's testimony entirely fails to identify or establish what damages was 
caused by Defendants' alleged negligence. . . . 
. . . Plaintiffs problem is that, without some expert to identify the damage 
caused by Defendants' alleged negligence, a jury would be left with nothing 
but speculation as a basis for any damages award. Dr. Stein agreed that 
there were several other possible or probable causes which may have 
contributed to Plaintiffs vision loss, but he was unable or unwilling to 
opine as to their relative causal effects. This is not to suggest that 
14 
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Plaintiffs expert must directly answer a question about "percentages." but 
Plaintiff must produce some expert who is willing to tell the jury what 
damage was caused by Defendants. 
. . . If Dr. Stein cannot measure, describe, compare, quantify, identify, isolate, 
gauge, estimate, apportion or delimit the damages which may have been 
proximately caused by Defendants' negligence, no jury can be expected to do so 
without indulging in rank speculation. 
(R447-48 (emphasis added)). 
26. The District Court further stated: "Plaintiff has failed to provide any expert 
testimony which would allow a jury to understand all of the possible causes of Plaintiff s 
vision loss and then reach a just verdict as to the damage which was caused by 
Defendants' negligence." (R447-48). 
27. Plaintiff initiated this appeal of the District Court's decision by arguing, for 
the first time, that Utah law does not require her to apportion the cause of her vision loss 
between the numerous possible causes set forth by the parties' medical experts and 
Plaintiffs treating physicians or even to establish to a degree of medical probability what 
vision loss was caused by Defendants' alleged negligence. (R470-71) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment in a medical 
malpractice action, Plaintiff is required to present expert testimony establishing to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability the fact of damages caused by alleged 
negligence. The fact of damages, as required by the Utah Supreme Court, refers to 
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evidence that links Defendants' care and treatment of Plaintiff to some demonstrable 
injury resulting from Defendants' negligent care. Plaintiffs expert testified that even 
with the best of care and in the absence of negligence, the natural progression of 
glaucoma could cause the vision loss that Plaintiff has experienced. Plaintiffs expert 
could not rule out or account for, non-negligent causes of Plaintiff s vision loss and could 
only testify in terms of possibilities rather than probabilities. 
Realizing her expert had failed to establish the causal link between Defendants' 
care and her vision loss during his deposition, Plaintiff attempted to create an issue of fact 
by submitting an affidavit from her expert in opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. To the extent the affidavit attempts to set forth a causal link, it 
necessarily contradicts the deposition testimony of plaintiff s expert where he was unable 
to state causation to any degree of reasonable medical probability (although asked to do 
so several times in several different ways). Accordingly, the District Court properly 
granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and concluded Plaintiff could not 
establish the fact of damages in relation to Defendants' care. Without this proof, the 
District Court properly concluded that any jury award in favor of Plaintiff would 
necessarily be based on unsupported speculation and conjecture. On appeal, Plaintiff now 
attempts to improperly shift the burden of proof of causation onto Defendants. 
16 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
ESTABLISH A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN HER INJURIES 
AND DEFENDANTS' CARE. 
A^  The District Court Correctly Concluded that Plaintiff Could 
Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Medical Malpractice. 
In order to establish a claim for medical malpractice, Utah law requires a Plaintiff 
to prove each of the following elements: (1) the standard of care applicable to the health 
care provider under similar circumstances; (2) a breach of the standard of care; (3) that 
Plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by negligence and (4) that damages occurred as 
a result of the negligence. See Kent v. Pioneer Hosp.. 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). In most cases, a Plaintiff is required to prove each of these elements through 
expert testimony.2 Utah law requires expert testimony in order to prove matters which 
"are outside the knowledge and experience of lay persons . . . ." Hoopiiaina v. 
Intermountain Health Care. 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (although hospital 
admitted to giving Plaintiff wrong drug, Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that 
2
 See Butterfield v. Okubu. 831 P.2d 97,101 -02 (Utah 1992) (setting forth 
requisites for expert's affidavit on standard of care and causation to survive motion for 
summary judgment); Huggins v. Hicken. 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 ("The 
evidence must be substantial and must, in cases of this complex type, have foundation in 
expert medical testimony."); Kent v. Pioneer Hosp.. 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) ("Because of the complex issues involved in a determination of proximate cause in 
a medical malpractice case, the Plaintiff must provide expert testimony establishing the 
health care provider's negligence proximately caused Plaintiffs injury."). 
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wrong drug caused any injuries).3 Often, a medical malpractice Plaintiff will 
demonstrate a causal connection between Defendants' care and Plaintiffs injury by ruling 
out or at least accounting for other possible causes of the injury.4 
"The rule is well established in this jurisdiction that where 'the proximate cause of 
the injury is left to conjecture, the Plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.'" Thurston v. 
Workers Compensation Fund. 83 P.3d 391, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Mahmood v. Ross. 
1999 UT 104, Tf22, 990 P.2d 933 (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff could not establish 
a causal link between Defendants' care and her vision loss and because any jury award in 
this medical malpractice action would necessarily be based on speculation, the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. 
Utah law allows a jury to award damages when Plaintiff establishes a causal 
connection that is based on reasonable probabilities; however, "'the evidence must do 
more than merely raise a conjecture or show a probability. Where there are probabilities 
3
 See also Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 740 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) ("When . . . the probabilities of a situation are outside the realm of 
common knowledge, expert evidence may be used to establish the necessary foundational 
probabilities."); Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah 
1981) (jury could properly find that Plaintiffs injury were caused by some other non-
negligent act rather than alleged negligence) 
4
 See Dallev v. Utah Valley Reg'l Med. Or.. 791 P.2d 193, (Utah 1990); Talbot 
v. Dr. W.H. Groves' Latter-Dav Saints Hosp.. Inc.. 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872, 873; see 
also Ballow v. Monroe. 699 P.2d 719, 722-23 (Utah 1985) (Plaintiff offered no testimony 
that defendant was negligent and admitted that non-negligent conduct may have caused 
fire to occur). 
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the other way equally or more potent the deductions are mere guesses and the jury should 
not be permitted to speculate.'" Mahmood v. Ross. 1999 UT 104, f22, 990 P.2d 933 
(citation omitted). In no instance may a Plaintiff satisfy her burden of proof by simply 
offering vague expert testimony that Defendants' care may have caused some of the 
alleged injury. 
In order "to withstand summary judgment, Plaintiff must at least create a material 
issue of fact as to whether the [alleged negligence] was the proximate cause of [the 
injury], and that [Plaintiff], in fact, suffered damages as a result." Kent v. Pioneer Hosp.. 
930 P.2d 904, 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added) (summary judgment upheld, 
finding nurse's affidavit was sufficient to establish breach, but nurse was not competent 
to establish that breach caused nerve damage). The Plaintiffs failure to produce evidence 
to establish any of the required elements justifies a grant of summary judgment. See 
Kent. 930 P.2d at 906; Forrest v. Eason. 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178, 180 (1953). 
Consistent with Utah law cited above, the District Court in this case required 
Plaintiff to provide expert testimony to establish that Defendants' care and treatment of 
Plaintiff was the cause of her damages. The District Court stated: "Without some expert 
to identify the damage caused by Defendants' alleged negligence, a jury would be left 
with nothing but speculation as a basis for any damages award." (R447-48) 
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i 
On appeal, Plaintiff now argues, for the first time, that the case ofTingey v. 
Christensen5 relieves her of her burden to establish a prima facie case of medical 
negligence. Plaintiff argues that she does not need to establish the cause of her vision 
loss, even though there is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered from glaucoma for at least 20 
years before she began treating with Defendants and in spite of the progressive nature of 
glaucoma. Plaintiff claims that requiring her to meet this burden forces her to provide 
percentages of damages attributable to Defendants' alleged negligence. The District 
Court, however, did not require Plaintiff to provide percentages of damages attributable 
to Defendants' alleged negligence. Rather, the trial court ruled: "This is not to suggest 
that Plaintiffs expert must directly answer a question about 'percentages,' but Plaintiff 
must produce some expert who is willing to tell the jury what damage was caused by 
Defendants." (R448) 
In Anderson v. Nixon, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the quantum of proof 
necessary to establish a causal connection between a health care provider's negligence 
and a Plaintiffs injury. See id.. 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220, overruled on other 
grounds by Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978). In Anderson, the Plaintiff alleged 
the physician was negligent in failing to treat him for a blood infection which ultimately 
5
 Tingey involves allegations of negligence related to an automobile accident. It is 
not a medical negligence action. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to cite a single case involving 
medical malpractice allegations in support of her arguments in this matter. 
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resulted in amputation of a portion of his leg. See id. Finding that the Plaintiff failed to 
produce sufficient expert testimony to link the negligence with the injury, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
There was no expert evidence in this case that if defendant had done these 
things at that time the condition which caused the eventual amputation of 
Plaintiffs leg could have been avoided. No expert testified that had Dr. 
Nixon recognized the symptoms of osteomyelitis he could have alleviated 
or cured it by using the ordinary skill, care, and knowledge of a physician 
practicing in that vicinity. 
Id at 220. 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the cause and cure of 
osteomyelitis are peculiarly within the knowledge of medical experts and not a matter of 
common knowledge. Id, Significantly, the Court went on to state: "In this case there was 
no evidence that anything Dr. Nixon did or failed to do after osteomyelitis developed 
caused the end result. In the absence of such expert testimony there is nothing upon 
which a jury can base its finding on the proximate cause of the injury." Id, Furthermore, 
in King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 862 (Utah 1992), the Court stated: 
"The law is clear that an undesired complication or result from medical treatment does 
not by itself imply that the result was caused by someone's breach of a duty of due care." 
Id. (citing Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves' Latter-Dav Saints Hosp.. Inc., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 
P.2d 872, 873 (1968)). 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
As in Anderson, in order to satisfy her burden regarding causation, Plaintiff must 
present expert testimony to establish that if Defendants had provided the care Plaintiff 
alleges was appropriate, she would not have suffered the same loss of vision in any 
event.6 Significantly, however, Plaintiffs own expert witness and one of her treating 
doctors both testified that Plaintiff could have suffered the same loss of vision that she 
experienced even with the best of care. Like the expert in Anderson, Plaintiffs own 
expert, Dr. Stein, could not state that anything Defendants did or did not do caused 
Plaintiffs vision loss. Thus, Plaintiff failed to show that it was Defendants' negligence, 
rather than some other cause, that led to her vision loss. In short, as was argued below, 
Plaintiffs reliance on the fact that she lost vision due to her glaucoma while under 
Defendants' care is insufficient to satisfy her burden of proof on the element of causation. 
Furthermore, all doctors involved in this case have identified many potential 
causes of Plaintiff s loss of vision. In its ruling, the District Court recognized that 
6
 See Dallev v. Utah Valley Reg'l Med. Or.. 791 P.2d 193, (Utah 1990) ("[R]es 
ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of negligence; it has no bearing 
on the issue of causation, which must be separately and independently established 
(quoting Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 1980))); see also Chadwick 
v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); King, 832 P.2d at 862 ("when the 
circumstances and the probabilities as to the causative factors of an accident lie within the 
ken of experts, expert evidence is necessary to establish a foundation that gives rise to an 
inference of negligence."); Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) (Plaintiff failed 
to present any evidence contradicting Defendants' expert's opinions that injury could 
have resulted in the absence of negligence and that other non-negligent sources could 
cause the condition). 
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Plaintiffs expert could not rule out other causes, or explain the causal relationship 
between the multiple possible causes of Plaintiff s alleged damages, stating: "Dr. Stein 
agreed that there were several other possible or probable causes which may have 
contributed to Plaintiffs vision loss, but he was unable or unwilling to opine as to their 
causal effects." (R447-48) The District Court summarized its ruling, stating: "Plaintiff 
has failed to provide any expert testimony which would allow a jury to understand all of 
the possible causes of Plaintiff s vision loss and then reach a just verdict as to the damage 
which was caused by Defendants' negligence." (R447-48 (emphasis added)). As in 
Anderson, Plaintiffs expert's testimony is insufficient to create an issue of fact for the 
jury. 
Likewise, in Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves' Latter-Dav Saints Hospital Inc.. the Utah 
Supreme Court determined a medical malpractice Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because he could not establish the cause of his injury and 
he left open the possibility of non-negligent causes. See Talbot. 440 P.2d at 874. A 
Plaintiff cannot satisfy the burden of proof by pointing out two possible causes or 
suggesting that Defendants' care might have caused some of the injury.7 Thus, in all 
medical malpractice cases, including even res ipsa loquitur cases, the Utah Supreme 
7
 See also Forrest v. Eason. 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178, 180 (1953) (rejecting 
Plaintiffs argument that if injury arises from two or more causes, one of which is health 
care provider's negligence, then it presents a jury question). 
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Court has consistently required a Plaintiff to prove a causal link between the negligence 
and the injury.8 In this case, the District Court correctly concluded that Plaintiff could not 
meet her burden. \ 
B. The District Court Properly Required Plaintiffs Expert to Come 
Forward With More Than Speculation To Find Defendants' Care 
More Likely Than Not Caused Identifiable Damages, 
< 
In making its ruling, the District Court correctly noted that the causal relationship 
between Defendants' treatment and Plaintiffs vision loss was outside the knowledge of 
the jury. The District Court ruled Plaintiffs expert had to assist the jury in establishing a 
causal link between Defendants' care and Plaintiffs injuries. At a minimum, this burden 
required, to a reasonable medical probability, evaluating other potential non-negligent < 
causes and demonstrating a link between Defendants' care and Plaintiffs injuries. 
Plaintiffs expert, however, could not rule out or otherwise account for other causes and, 
in fact, admitted that non-negligent conduct and even the progressive nature of glaucoma 
itself could have caused Plaintiffs vision loss. Thus, the District Court correctly ruled 
that the jury could not render a judgment for Plaintiff without resorting to unsupported ( 
conjecture or speculation. The District Court's ruling is consistent with "[t]he general 
8
 See Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (Plaintiff could not establish a causal connection between negligence and her 
injury, nor could she rule out non-negligent potential causes of her injury); see also 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n.17 (Utah 1980) (applying res ipsa loquitur to 
relieve Plaintiff of her burden with respect to standard of care but noting that expert 
testimony would be required to establish proximate cause). 
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rule regarding the certainty of an expert's opinion [which] is that the expert many not give 
an opinion which represents a mere guess, speculation, or conjecture." Thurston v. 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. 2003 UT App 438, f20, 83 P.3d 391. 
In Arnold v. Curtis, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to a doctor because Plaintiffs expert's affidavit failed to establish 
causation. See Arnold. 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). The Defendants' expert had 
opined that "in any event, had an earlier diagnosis been made, the outcome would have 
been the same . . . . " Id. Finding Plaintiffs expert's affidavit deficient, the Court stated: 
"The affidavit of [Plaintiff s expert] is devoid of any statement of proximate cause and in 
no way counters or contradicts the opinion of [Defendants' expert] that an earlier 
diagnosis of [Plaintiffs injury] would not have permitted earlier treatment or surgery for 
that condition." Id9 
Likewise, in this case, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof when faced 
with Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. "Just because there is proof that some 
of the claimed injury and loss was caused by the breach of duty does not necessarily mean 
that all damages resulted from the breach." Dunn v. Cadiente. M.D.. 516 N.E.2d 52, 55 
9
 See also Dunn v. McKay Burton, McMurrav & Thurman. 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 
1978) (no evidence that attorney's negligence caused Plaintiffs damages); Clark v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (expert testimony that "the 
facts of this total accident are so vague and unidentifiable that it is really hard to be 
precise in coming to any conclusion because there's . . . no precise data on which to draw 
those conclusions."). 
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i 
(Ind. 1988) (emphasis in original) (holding Plaintiff failed in his burden of proof and not 
entitled to recover for all of his injuries where Plaintiffs expert admitted that some of 
Plaintiffs injuries were inevitable and may not relate to doctor's negligence). 
Like the cases cited above where courts have ruled that an expert's testimony is 
insufficient, in this case, Plaintiffs expert expresses his opinions merely in terms of 
"may" or "could." (R243-45,250,252-53,397). For example, Dr. Stein was critical of 
Defendants' care and opined that Defendants were not aggressive enough in their 
treatment of Plaintiff s glaucoma. (R260) Nevertheless, Dr. Stein's deposition testimony 
only indicated causal possibilities when asked specifically to explain this vague 
statement: 
Plaintiffs injuries could occur even with the best of care (R243); 
Plaintiffs fluctuating eye pressures could occur for variety of reasons, 
including lack of patient compliance (R244-45); 
Progression of glaucoma and deteriorating vision is matter of luck and he 
can't say what the future holds for Plaintiff in this case (R249); 
• Injuries from glaucoma do not automatically equate to negligence (R250); 
Glaucoma can be difficult to control with even the best of care (R250-51); 
With aggressive treatment, Plaintiff might not have lost vision (R252); 
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He cannot state with any medical certainty what her loss of vision may have 
been absent negligence (R252-53); 
• Patient compliance could have been an issue, and non-compliance issues 
arose at a critical time (R254-55); 
• Some patients can withstand higher eye pressures with no damage, and 
some patients have optic nerve damage when pressures are within normal ranges (R256); 
List of non-negligent factors that may cause elevated eye pressures (R257-
58); 
He is uncertain as to effect of Plaintiffs unrelated cataract on her vision 
loss (R261) 
Dr. Stein's deposition testimony unequivocally reveals that he was unable to state 
to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Plaintiffs partial loss of vision would 
not have occurred absent Defendants' alleged negligent care. As such, his opinions were 
merely possibilities and not probabilities. Under Utah law, where expert testimony is 
required to establish a Plaintiffs burden, expert testimony which only raises possibilities 
instead of probabilities is insufficient. 
II. DR. STEIN'S AFFIDAVIT IS INCONSISTENT WITH AND 
CONTRADICTS HIS DEPOSITION TESTIMONY. 
Utah law is well-settled that when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, he 
may not thereafter attempt to raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which expressly or 
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< 
impliedly contradicts his deposition testimony unless he can explain the discrepancy. See 
Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 2006 UT App 304, ^[13, 141 P.3d 624; Webster v. Sill 
675 P.2d 1170, 117.2-73 (Utah 1983). In Webster, "the Plaintiff filed an affidavit that 
impliedly, if not directly, contradicted a critical part of his [earlier] deposition." IdL at 
1172. The Utah Supreme Court held that the affidavit should be excluded from the trial 
court's consideration and reasoned that a party may not create inconsistencies with his 
deposition testimony in the hopes of creating issues of fact. See id. The Court found that 
"[a] contrary rule would undermine the utility of summary judgment as a means for 
screening out sham issues of fact." Id. at 1173. Thus, as a general rule, an affidavit that 
disputes the affiant's prior deposition testimony should be disregarded by the court in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.10 
After Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits of 
two experts that relied, inter alia, on Dr. Robert Stein's testimony during his deposition, 
Plaintiff filed an affidavit of Dr. Stein in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment in attempt to create an issue of fact. Dr. Stein stated in his affidavit that 
Defendants' alleged breaches of the standard of care "resulted in a direct consequence to 
the health and condition of Plaintiffs eyes and caused her to sustain both a significant 
10
 See id.; see also Guardian State Bank v. Humphervs. 762 P.2d 1084, 1087 
(Utah 1988); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham. 10 Utah 2d 329, 353 P.2d 
168, 170 (1960); Gaw v. State By and Through Dept. of Transp.. 798 P.2d 1130, 1140-41 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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and a permanent loss of vision that she would not have otherwise sustained in the absence 
of their negligence." (R398) In contrast to his affidavit, however, Dr. Stein testified 
during his deposition that, even with the best of care, patients with glaucoma may suffer 
vision loss. (R252) Consistent with the premise that glaucoma may cause vision loss 
even with non-negligent treatment, Dr. Stein conceded that he could not state to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability whether Plaintiff would have suffered the same 
visual field losses she currently experiences even with the best of care. (R243-45, 249-58) 
He also admitted that he is unable to quantify the amount of vision loss or damage caused 
by the alleged breaches of the standard of care in this case. (R262). 
In summary, to the extent Dr. Stein's affidavit attempts to establish a causal link 
between Plaintiffs vision loss and defendants' treatment of her glaucoma, his affidavit is 
necessarily contradicted his deposition testimony. See, infra, note 1. Plaintiff cannot 
create issues of fact to defeat summary judgment by proffering an affidavit which is 
inconsistent with or contradicts prior deposition testimony. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS TINGEY V. 
CHRISTENSEN BECAUSE IT IS DISTINGUISHABLE AND 
SHOULD NOT APPLY TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS. 
In order to overcome summary judgment and eliminate her prima facie burden 
with respect to causation, Plaintiff now argues, for the first time, that a doctrine borrowed 
from automobile personal injury actions applies in this medical malpractice action. 
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Although Plaintiff failed to raise the argument below11, she now claims it is Defendants' 
burden to apportion the vision loss caused by her pre-existing conditions (glaucoma, 
cataract, diabetes, noncompliance) and the vision loss caused by an alleged breach of the 
standard of care. Plaintiff relies on the automobile accident case ofTingey v. 
Christensen, 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588 to support her argument. 
In addition to not addressing the burden of proof for medical malpractice claims, 
the procedural posture ofTingy is inapplicable to this case in which the District Court 
concluded Plaintiff cannot prove causation. In Tingey, the defendant conceded liability 
and admitted to causing the automobile accident in which the plaintiff was injured. As 
part of her claim, the plaintiff requested damages for aggravation of a pre-existing injury 
(unlike here where Plaintiffs vision problems could be caused by ongoing conditions). 
The District Court rejected the plaintiffs request to instruct the jury that if the jury could 
not apportion the damages than it could find the defendant liable for the entire amount. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that Utah law supported the plaintiffs requested 
jury instruction, but found the error to be harmless. See id. at ^ [15. 
The Supreme Court's ruling was based on several legal principles. See id. at Tfl4. 
Importantly, in terms of its application to this medical malpractice action, the Court relied 
11
 Plaintiff has waived the right to argue that Tingey v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68, 
987 P.2d 588 applies to this case by failing to raise this argument below. Accordingly, 
the Court should decline to consider its application here. 
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on the following: "once the fact of damage is established, 'a defendant should not escape 
liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with precision.'" Id. 
Establishing the "fact of damage" necessarily includes establishing that the injury or 
damage was caused by Defendants' negligent conduct. In this matter, however, as 
Defendants argued to the District Court, Plaintiff cannot prove this causal relationship 
and so cannot prove the "fact of damage." Plaintiffs argument that the causal element of 
her vision loss must be assumed simply because she lost vision during the time frame she 
was in Defendants' care is inconsistent with well-established Utah law. Furthermore, her 
attempt to shift the burden of proof regarding causation is also contrary to Utah law. 
In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants' experts, Doctors 
Bogus and Singh, opined that Plaintiffs injury may have resulted under even the best of 
care. Far from contradicting this opinion, and unlike the Plaintiff in Tingey, Plaintiffs 
own expert, Dr. Stein, agreed that Plaintiff may have suffered the same injuries even with 
non-negligent care. Furthermore, Plaintiffs expert could not remove the possibility that 
Plaintiffs own fault in failing to follow Defendants' recommendations may have caused 
or exacerbated her injuries. Finally, Plaintiffs treating doctor, Dr. Newman, confirmed 
all of the experts' opinions that even with non-negligent care Plaintiff could have 
experienced the same vision loss. The doctrine set forth in Tingey simply has no 
application to this case where Plaintiff has not proved the "fact of damages", including 
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the cause of her vision loss, and where she has ongoing conditions (including the 
progressive nature of glaucoma itself). 
Furthermore, Tingey should not be applied to medical malpractice actions. 
Plaintiffs application of Tingey completely eviscerates the well-established burdens 
required of Plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. Under Utah law, after establishing 
the standard of care and a breach of that standard, a medical malpractice Plaintiff must 
establish a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injuries. It is not 
sufficient to allege that the breach of the applicable standard of care caused all of 
Plaintiffs alleged damages and then shift the burden to Defendants to prove otherwise, as 
Plaintiff suggests in this case. Well-established Utah law places the burden on Plaintiff to 
establish a causal connection between the alleged breach and identifiable injuries and 
damages. 
The application of Tingey to a medical malpractice case would result in a 
wholesale change to Utah law for medical malpractice actions. Unlike the motor vehicle 
drivers in Tingey, by definition medical patients (i.e. potential medical malpractice 
Plaintiffs) all have pre-existing and ongoing medical conditions. Applying Tingey would 
essentially force health care providers to assume liability for both the medical problem for 
which the patient originally sought care and any aggravation of that pre-existing 
condition. This places an impossible burden on physicians, essentially making them 
guarantors of successful care and unfairly shifts the burden of proof with respect to 
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causation. Under Plaintiffs argument, health care providers would bear the burden of 
trying to apportion damages and disproving liability for pre-existing conditions. This 
result is inconsistent with well-established Utah law, which puts this burden on Plaintiffs. 
Moreover, Utah would not be well served by a rule that makes health care 
providers presumptively liable for damages flowing from their patients' pre-existing 
medical conditions. Such a rule would unfairly increase verdicts against healthcare 
providers and inevitably drive up medical malpractice insurance premiums - a result the 
Utah Legislature has consistently acted to prevent. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq. 
Plaintiff has not established the fact of damages to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty because she cannot show to a reasonable medical probability what injury was 
caused by Defendants' care. Because Plaintiffs expert could not rule out or even account 
for other possible non-negligent causes, including Plaintiffs own fault, the District Court 
properly concluded any jury award would be based on speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff could establish a causal link between her 
alleged loss of vision and the Defendants' treatment of Plaintiff s glaucoma. Plaintiff 
presented expert testimony to try to establish a prima facie breach of the standard of care 
and damages caused by the breach. In order to withstand Defendants' Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, Plaintiff needed to also establish a causal link between the breach 
and her vision loss. It is not sufficient to allege a breach and damages and then assume 
the two are related, or ask the Court or jury to bridge the gap between the two. In this 
case, Plaintiffs expert testified as to other possible, non-negligent causes of Plaintiff s 
vision loss and was unable to account for them or provide any expert guidance for the 
fact finder as to how to evaluate the damages. Thus, he was only able to testify in terms 
of possibilities rather than probabilities. The District Court found this to be insufficient. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request this Court affirm the District Court's Motion 
for Summary Judgment in their favor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [ / ' d a y of November, 2006. 
EPPERSON & RENCHER RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
CoiJ&>ec^ 
Stephen! W. Owens ^Cnpistian W. Nelson 
ttandonB. Hobbs 
Zachary E. Peterson 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 3tf\ day of November, 2006 to the 
following: 
James E. Morton 
Jacquelynn D. Carmichael 
EISENBERG, GILCHRIST & MORTON 
900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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